Lex non favet delicatorum votis by Sushma Gowda

Literal meaning:- The law does not favor the wishes of the dainty

Origin:- The law does not favour the wishes of the fastidious. Trifling results are disregarded, for the courts proceed with great caution, and will not interfere with the use of the property by the owner thereof unless such use is unreasonable

Explanation:- An action does not lie because of a trifling inconvenience, which would only be regarded as such by the dainty.

Illustration:- The fact that right of the easement has not been acquired, if the obstruction constitutes a nuisance, certainly a claim for that abatement in the shape of injunction or damages will lie. It need not be pointed out that what constitutes nuisance would be a question of fact in each case — Per Lord Loreburn in -‘Polsue and Alfeini v. Rushmer’, (1907) A. C. 121 (N), quoting Lord Halsbury in –‘Colls v Home and Colonial Stores’, 1904 A. C. 179 (O)’. It must be an inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary comfort physically of human existence. In other words, the law would not favour the modes of the dainty and would only support the plain sober and simple notions among the people. ‘Lex non favet delicatorum votis’

Case Reference:-

Now upon the main question we should in the first place premise that the slaughter of cattle under certain circumstances would be a public nuisance, and it might also be obnoxious to rules and regulations lawfully promulgated for observance in a town or village, and further that kine must not be slaughtered in such places or manner as to be a nuisance or in contravention of any such rules and regulations. We may also say that it is in the highest degree desirable that the members of the different religious persuasions who are to be found in this country should, in the observance of their religious ceremonies as well as in the exercise of their lawful rights, show respect for the feelings and sentiments of those belonging to different persuasions, and avoid anything calculated to irritate the religious susceptibilities of any class of the community. But when a question in which the ordinary rights of property are involved comes before us, we must, before we can allow those rights to be infringed, endeavour to find the existence of some principle or rule of law justifying a ruling that the wishes or susceptibilities of individuals can be allowed to override such rights. Acts calculated to offend the sentiments of a class do not necessarily amount to a public nuisance. Lex non favet votis delicatorum. The law makes no allowance for the susceptibilities of the hyper-sensitive. In our judgment, then, we shall deal limply with the broad question whether the right to slaughter kine on their own premises by Muhammadans in the village of Behta Goshain is illegal. Turner, C.J., in the case of Muttumira v. Queen-Empress (1884) I.L.R. 7 Mad. 590 observed: “A public nuisance is defined by the Penal Code as an act or omission which causes any common injury, danger or annoyance to the public or people in general who dwell or occupy property in the vicinity, or which must necessarily cause obstruction, danger or annoyance to persons who may have occasion to use any public right. It is obvious from the language of the Act that it was not intended to apply to acts or omissions calculated to offend the sentiments of a class. In this country, it must often happen that acts are done by the followers of a creed which must be offensive to the sentiments of those who follow other creeds.” In the case of Queen-Empress v. Byramji Edalji (1887) I.L.R. 12 Bom. 437 an accused appealed against his conviction of an offence under Section 268 of the Indian Penal Code in having cut up in his verandah meat which was to be cooked for a dinner party, exposing it to the sight of persons passing along the road, among; whom were some Jains, whose temple was close by. The Magistrate had found the accused guilty of committing a public nuisance, on the ground that he had done an act by which several people who were Jains were much annoyed, they have a great repugnance to the taking of life under any circumstances. The conviction was set aside by Birdwood and Parsons, JJ., who in the course of their judgment observed that the annoyance complained of “neither did nor could cause any sensible or real damage. It was an annoyance merely by reason of bursting the feelings of the Jains, who have a repugnance to the killing of animals. It was thus of the nature of a sentimental grievance which could be felt only by persons holding certain views as to the killing of animals.” In the case of Queen-Emptean v. Zaki-ud-din (1887) I.L.R. 10 All. 44 certain Muhammadans had been convicted on a charge of having for a religious purpose killed and cut up two cows before sunrise in a private compound partly visible from a public road, the killing of one cow being witnessed by a Hindu. It was held by Brodhurst, J., on an application for revision of the order of conviction passed by the Magistrate under Section 290 of the Indian Penal Code, that the circumstances proved did not amount to the commission of a public nuisance as defined in Section 268 of the Code. Further, in the case of Queen-Empress v. Imam Ali (1887) I.L.R. 10 All. 150 it was held by a Full Bench of this High Court that a cow was not “an object within the meaning of Section 295 of the Indian Penal Code,” and that the slaughter of a cow was not an offence under that section. The decision in Romesh Chunder Sannyal v. Hiru Mondal (1890) I.L.R. 17 Calc. 852 is to the same effect.